European Affairs Magazine

Trump’s initiatives to end the war not because of Russia’s defeat on the battlefield, but because of dialogue, give Russia a great opportunity to get out of the strategic impasse. Despite the demonstration of confidence in their forces, Moscow is well aware that the continuation of hostilities against Ukraine leads to a weakening of Russia’s strategic positions. Even the fiercest supporters of V. Putin’s regime state the threat of a rapid reduction in Russia’s economic and human potential, and ordinary Russians, against the background of a decrease in the standard of living, discuss the stated goals of SVO in kitchens as unattainable and unreasonable whims. Instead, the prospect of lifting sanctions, restoring trade, economic and investment cooperation finds a positive response among the Russian establishment, primarily in the entourage of V. Putin. Keep Reading

Hungary, Paks II and Viktor Orbán. How European unity is being undermined by corruption in Hungary’s nuclear power industry.

Budapest will not allow the imposition of EU sanctions against Russia in the nuclear sector because they could affect its energy security, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has said. This specifically concerns Russia’s construction of the second stage of the Paks nuclear power plant. It is likely that the ‘first concrete’ will be in place for the base of the reactor room in the first quarter of 2025.

From the outset, the Paks II project has been the subject of heated debate in the country and criticism from Hungary’s EU partners.

First things first, because the construction of the fifth and sixth units of the Paks NPP does not mean Hungary’s energy independence. On the contrary, because Paks II is being built with third-generation Russian WWER-1200 reactors, the country will become even more dependent on Russia.

The involvement of the Russian state corporation Rosatom in the construction is another clear sign of the process by which Moscow is systematically strengthening its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. This undermines EU strategic interests and weakens Russia’s influence on European countries.

The project is also marred by accusations of corruption against the government of Viktor Orbán, including a lack of transparency in the selection and distribution of construction contracts.

August 2022, Hungary awarded a licence for the Paks II project to the Russian state corporation Rosatom. Rosatom was selected as the general contractor without a tender. Some of the documents related to the contract for the construction of the nuclear power plant are classified for 30 years. The decision to start earthworks at Paks II was taken by Budapest at the end of May 2020, even before Rosatom had received the necessary permits.

At the same time, Budapest obstructed the European Commission’s investigation into the non-transparency of the deal with Russia, focusing on the “political context” of the agreement. As a result, the European Commission was forced to approve the project.

According to Direkt36.hu, an online investigative website, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in 2023 prevented Rosatom from being excluded from the project and replaced by the French company Framatome, despite the position of the state-owned Paks II Zrt, which is responsible for the construction of Paks II.

According to Hungarian investigators, Russia has been influencing Hungary’s energy sector through the country’s interior minister, Sándor Pinter. As a high-ranking Hungarian police officer, he has been lobbying for the interests of Russian oligarchs and Russia since the 1990s.

In 1994, Pinter received a large sum of money from Russia, which was used to finance the Fidesz-HCA party’s election campaign. In 1998, this party won the parliamentary elections and Viktor Orbán led his first government.

Sándor Pintér is in control of Hungary’s major energy companies through the appointment of people close to him to the boards of directors and management of the companies. The most important management decisions are taken after approval from the Kremlin.

Pintér has lobbied for the appointment of people close to him to the management boards of the country’s leading energy companies. Among them is the head of the energy company FGSZ Zrt. Krisztóf Tergées, chairman of energy company Magyar Földgazkereskedő Zrt. Laszlo Fozekas, Paks II CEO Gergely Yakli, Paks II Director and Atomstroyexport Vice President Vitaly Polyanin, Paks II Construction Director Alexander Tupitsyn and Paks II Programme Director Laszlo Kisz. Viktor Orbán, leader of the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance party, has been head of the Hungarian government since winning the 2010 general election. He is known for his authoritarian rhetoric and pragmatic policies aimed at maintaining power.

A protracted conflict with the EU has resulted from his policies: The European Commission has criticised Hungary’s rule of law, judicial independence and media freedom. The EU has repeatedly imposed sanctions on Hungary, including threats of a cut in some of its financial aid.

In the area of human rights in particular, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a law restricting minority rights and tightened migration policy. This has been one of the reasons for the confrontation with the European Commission.

The current Hungarian government has restricted freedom of speech in the country, using the established National Media Council to control many media outlets. A bill, similar to the Russian law on ‘inagents’, is currently being drafted to track foreign funding of Hungarian media. This will further restrict the activities of independent media.

Orbán uses anti-Brussels rhetoric, claiming to defend national sovereignty and criticising the EU’s ‘liberal’ policies as he consolidates his power. He is also in favour of lifting the sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

Orbán and his entourage have been accused of corruption on several occasions. Specifically, with respect on public tenders and the financing of major construction projects. Orbán’s close ties to the oligarchs, who have received lucrative contracts in the midst of rising public debt and spending, are also frequently criticised.

Since 2010, Orbán and the Fidesz-HCA party have created a ‘mafia state’ in Hungary, where all power belongs to a group linked to the party and Orbán personally, according to political scientist Bálint Magyar. One of the most recent corruption scandals involves Orbán’s son-in-law István Tiborcz, who opened the Dorothea Hotel in Budapest in 2023 with financial support from the Hungarian government and pro-government businessmen. And it was the Dorothea Hotel that was included by the Hungarian government in the list of recommended hotels for European politicians and delegations arriving for the Budapest Summit of the European Political Community in November 2024.

The Dorothea Hotel has been used by the Hungarian secret services to eavesdrop on European leaders, according to our sources. This is nothing new for Viktor Orbán’s government.

Late last year, the internet resource Direkt36.hu and the Belgian newspaper De Tijd published an investigation, according to which the Hungarian Information Office (local foreign intelligence service) monitored European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) employees.

In specific, between 2015 and 2017, the Hungarian intelligence service conducted surveillance and bugging of the cars of OLAF employees. The European Anti-Fraud Office then became interested in the activities of the Hungarian company Elios, owned by the son-in-law of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, István Tiborcz. Elios was the recipient of government contracts for construction and urban infrastructure, from lighting to transport.

The corruption and the political manipulation of the Orbán government that go hand in hand with the Paks II project undermine the unity of the European Union. Unless the EU finds effective mechanisms to fight corruption and protect democratic values, it may face even greater internal disunity and the growing influence of third countries on the internal politics of its members.

By James Johnson

Source: https://geopolitic.info/index.php/2025/03/10/raks-ii-what-is-on-the-bottom/